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The awards by the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (further: 
the Arbitral Tribunal) concerning the contract on gas supplies to Naftohaz and the volume of 
Russian gas transit via Ukraine have radically changed the model of gas relations between the 
two countries as they have existed until now. Kyiv’s victory is its crowning achievement in the 
process of emancipation from Russian dominance in the energy sector which began after the 
Revolution of Dignity. This has also significantly strengthened Ukraine’s position with regard to 
Russia and the EU because Gazprom was found to have been in breach of the transit contract. 
The decisions of the Arbitral Tribunal mark a caesura in the gas co-operation between Ukraine 
and Russia, which has continued for almost three decades and become infected with corrup-
tion, lack of transparency and politically motivated decisions. Since the collapse of the USSR, 
Ukraine has been dependent on Russian gas supplies, and has been one of Gazprom’s key clients. 
As long as natural gas remained relatively cheap, this situation was satisfactory to contractors 
in Ukraine as well, as it offered great opportunities for a section of the Ukrainian political class 
to build up their fortunes illegally. However, during Vladimir Putin’s presidency (since 2000), 
Moscow has capitalised many times on Ukraine’s gas dependence to achieve its political goals. 
The Revolution of Dignity and the war with Russia were breakthrough moments in energy re-
lations with Russia. The new government in Kyiv, unlike all its predecessors, took the risk of 
entering into a legal dispute with Gazprom. 
Ukraine and Russia are entering a new stage of gas relations in 2018, one dictated not so much 
by a desire to co-operate but rather by the need to do so resulting from contractual obligations 
with regard to their partners in the EU, the transport infrastructure available, and Ukraine’s in-
come from transit. This co-operation will be very difficult, and will most likely entail further court 
disputes, as well as periodical cuts in gas supplies, which cannot be ruled out. Kyiv’s new asser-
tiveness, coupled with Moscow’s increasing frustration, give grounds for the assumption that this 
forced co-operation will not be effective. This will give rise to further problems in both bilateral re-
lations and EU-Ukraine-Russia relations. At the same time, if Nord Stream 2 and Turkish Stream are 
completed, Russia is likely to become independent of Ukraine’s gas mains in the next five years. 
1991-2014: Ukraine as Russia’s gas vassal
Gazprom has always had the dominant position 
in the two states’ bilateral relations. The com-
pany was the sole gas supplier to the Ukrainian 
market for a long time, and it also transported 
gas to Europe via the Ukrainian network. Natu-
ral gas was relatively cheap for the first fifteen 
years after the collapse of the USSR. Even though 
Ukraine reduced its imports, it still imported 70 
bcm of gas annually on average. At that time Kyiv 
was not concerned about limiting consumption 
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or energy efficiency. On the contrary: gas im-
ports from Russia were the source of the larg-
est fortunes among the first wave of Ukraini-
an oligarchs, and the larger its volumes, the 
more they earned. Gas import agency services, 
where corruption was inherent, were also one 
of the key instruments employed by Russia to 
influence Ukraine. The deal was mutually ben-
eficial because Ukraine was one of the largest 
gas sale markets for Russia, and even became 
the largest individual recipient of Russian gas in 
2005-2011; in 2005-2006 the supply volume ex-
ceeded 59 bcm (Germany has only held the first 
position since 2012). Ukraine’s share in Russian 
gas supplies to foreign markets in 2005-2012 
ranged between 17% and 22%.
However, Moscow viewed gas co-operation 
above all as an instrument of political influence 
on Ukraine. Before 2014, Moscow capitalised 
on Kyiv’s gas dependence on numerous occa-
sions to earn political dividends. One example 
of this was Russia’s reaction to the victory of the 
so-called Orange Revolution in 2005. That pro-
voked the outbreak of the first serious gas war, 
resulting in gas supplies to Europe being cut for 
two weeks, and gas blackmail turned out to be 
a successful tool of Russian influence in Ukraine. 
On the one hand, gas prices were raised, and 
on the other, RosUkrEnergo began acting as 
an agent in trade relations between Gazprom 
and Naftohaz. Using its accumulated funds, 
RosUkrEnergo was able to lobby for Russian in-
terests in Ukraine’s economic and political life. 
In turn, in 2009 Gazprom made Kyiv sign ex-
tremely unfavourable ten-year contracts cover-
ing gas purchase and transit, as well as the so-
called ‘fleet for gas’ deal in 2010, as a result of 
which Russia strengthened its military presence 
in Crimea1. Similarly, in December 2013, at the 
time of President Yanukovych’s visit to Moscow 
during the period of massive anti-government 
demonstrations in Kyiv, Gazprom reduced the 
price for Naftohaz after the Ukrainian govern-
ment had decided a few weeks before to sus-
pend the process of signing the Ukraine–EU 
Association Agreement. These examples prove 
that Moscow treated gas prices as an instrument 
for ‘rewarding’ Ukrainian governments loyal to 
the Kremlin or ‘punishing’ the disloyal ones. 
Ukraine was of key significance for Gazprom as 
a transit route for Russian gas supplied to Euro-
pean recipients, and for many years the compa-
ny continued its efforts to take control of the 
Ukrainian gas pipeline network. When these 
efforts proved unsuccessful, Moscow began 
implementing the policy of diversifying transit 
routes, quite consistently since the beginning of 
this century, thus creating another instrument 
of political pressure on Kyiv. Whereas in 2003, 
the share of the Ukrainian gas mains in the tran-
sit of Russian gas to Europe reached 89%, it had 
begun falling at a regular rate from 2006, down 
to the level of 62% in 2009-2011. The launch 
of the Nord Stream 1 gas pipeline contributed 
to the further undermining of Ukraine’s role as 
a transit country, and its share in Russian gas 
transit to Europe fell to 47% in 2013. 
After the Euromaidan – the emancipation 
of Naftohaz…
The Revolution of Dignity and the overthrow 
of Viktor Yanukovych’s government brought 
about a major staff reshuffle in Ukraine, also 
covering Naftohaz, the state-owned energy gi-
ant which accounts for nearly all of the coun-
try’s gas production, gas transport inside the 
1 For more information, see: S. Matuszak, Ukraine and 
Russia: a hindered rapprochement, OSW Commentary, 
15.12.2010, https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw- 
commentary/2010-12-15/ukraine-and-russia-a-hindered-
rapprochement
Gas imports from Russia were the source of 
the largest fortunes for Ukrainian oligarchs, 
whereas the Kremlin viewed gas exports as 
a key instrument of influence on Ukrainian 
politics.
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country, and transit of Russian gas to the EU 
and the injection of Russian gas in gas storages 
the total capacity of which is 32 bcm. The sen-
ior managerial positions were taken by young 
and vigorous investment bankers who never-
theless already had considerable experience in 
the gas sector, and the new members of the 
supervisory board included three Western ex-
perts who backed the new management board 
in their efforts to reorganise the indebted and 
inefficient corporation. 
In June 2014, since no compromise had been 
reached as regards the gas price for Ukraine 
and the value of the Ukrainian debt, Gazprom 
withheld gas supplies and brought a suit against 
Naftohaz to the Arbitral Tribunal to recover the 
debt. The management board of Naftohaz also 
sued Gazprom2, demanding that a fair gas price 
be set, and contested the transit conditions in 
the second suit brought in October. This was 
an unprecedented move in the history of gas dis-
putes, also regarding the scale – the total value 
of both parties’ claims in 2017 exceeded US$80 
billion. Before the Revolution of Dignity in Febru-
ary 2014, Viktor Yanukovych and the Party of Re-
gions only contested the gas deals with Russia to 
keep up appearances, and used the disputes in 
the struggle with their opponents on the domes-
tic political scene, above all Yulia Tymoshenko, 
but they never decided to contest them in court. 
Unlike the previous governments, the post-rev-
olution Ukrainian leaders did not choose to end 
the dispute behind the scenes (as was done by 
the cabinets led by Tymoshenko in 2009 and 
Yanukovych in 2010 and 2013), and further 
phases of negotiations concerning so-called 
‘winter packages’3 took place in a fully trans-
2 S. Kardaś, W. Konończuk, Russia and Ukraine’s ‘cold 
gas war’, OSW Analyses, 25.06.2014, https://www.osw.
waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2014-06-25/russia-and-
ukraines-cold-gas-war
3 S. Kardaś, W. Konończuk, A. Łoskot-Strachota, Success? 
The Russia/Ukraine/EU gas agreement, OSW Analyses, 
5.11.2014, https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/anal-
yses/2014-11-05/success-russia/ukraine/eu-gas-agree-
ment; S. Kardaś, T. Iwański, Gazprom’s tactical conces-
sions to Ukraine, OSW Analyses, 15.04.2015, https://
www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2015-04-15/
gazproms-tactical-concessions-to-ukraine
parent manner and with the participation of 
the European Commission. These deals were 
a temporary success for Kyiv because on the 
one hand it ensured supplies of Russian gas in 
the needed quantities and at a good price, and 
on the other it avoided provisions that could 
have undermined Naftohaz’s position in the 
dispute at the Arbitral Tribunal.
In parallel to this, with the EU’s support, Kyiv 
embarked on a gas sector reform in October 
2015. The gradual reorganisation of Naftohaz4 
and the liberalisation of the domestic market 
accelerated the process of signing agreements 
with network operators in Poland and Hunga-
ry, and above all, launching the reversal of the 
Ukrainian-Slovak Vojany-Uzhhorod pipeline in 
2015 (with an annual capacity of 14.5 bcm), 
without which Ukraine’s room for manoeuvre in 
contacts with Gazprom would have been very 
limited. The success of these moves5, coupled 
with financial guarantees from international 
financial institutions (the EBRD and the World 
Bank), encouraged European energy companies 
and global gas traders to enter the Ukrainian 
market. As domestic gas consumption was fall-
ing, due to the loss of part of Ukraine’s territo-
ries and the economic breakdown, Ukraine was 
gradually reducing its dependence on Russian 
gas supplies, and satisfying its demands with 
4 T. Iwański, Ukraine: the beginning of Naftogaz’s restruc-
turing, OSW Analyses, 13.07.2016, https://www.osw.
waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2016-07-13/ukraine-be-
ginning-naftogazs-restructuring
5 T. Iwański, Ukraine: successful diversification of gas sup-
ply, OSW Analyses, 3.02.2016, https://www.osw.waw.
pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2016-02-03/ukraine-success-
ful-diversification-gas-supply
The post-revolution Ukrainian leaders, un-
like the previous governments, brought 
a suit against the Russian company to the 
Arbitral Tribunal, and negotiated the so-
called ‘winter packages’ with the participa-
tion of the European Commission.
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imports from the West (5.1 bcm in 2014, 10.3 
bcm in 2015, 11.1 bcm in 2016 and 14.1 bcm 
in 20176). As a result, in September 2015, as the 
second and final so-called ‘winter package’ was 
signed, Kyiv completely stopped importing gas 
directly from Gazprom. In 2016-17, for the first 
time in history, Ukraine satisfied its demand for 
gas with domestic output and imports from the 
EU alone7.
…and the failure of the Russian strategy
After the Revolution of Dignity, gas issues 
ceased to be an effective means for building 
and strengthening Russia’s political influence 
in Ukraine. The cutting of gas supplies to 
Ukraine in June 2014, the internationalisation 
of the Russian-Ukrainian gas dispute as a result 
of the launch of the trilateral talks between the 
EU, Ukraine and Russia, and the initiation of 
the arbitration proceedings concerning gas 
supply contracts and the transit contract de-
prived Moscow of its direct instrument for in-
fluencing the situation in Kyiv. Actions like the 
launch of direct gas supplies in February 2015 
to the part of the Donbass occupied by Russia 
have also failed to bring the effects expected 
by Moscow8. 
Furthermore, Gazprom has lost one of its most 
significant individual export markets. While in 
2013 Russian gas supplies reached 25.8 bcm, in 
2014 their volume was reduced to 14.5 bcm, 
and finally to zero in 2016-2017 as a result 
of Kyiv stopping its purchases of gas from 
Russia9. However, Gazprom sustained a finan-
6 Source: Naftogaz.
7 Source: Naftogaz.
8 S. Kardaś, Russian gas for the Donbas: the games being 
played with Kyiv and Brussels, OSW Analyses, 25.02.2015, 
https: //www.osw.waw.pl /en/publikacje /analyses / 
2015-02-25/russian-gas-donbas-games-being-played-
kyiv-and-brussels
9 In Russian statistics for 2014-2017, supplies to the Rus-
sia-occupied parts of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts are 
calculated as supplies to Ukraine. In the light of the 
Arbitration Court’s award of 22 December 2017, howev-
er, these should not be treated as the implementation 
of the obligations under the contract of 2009. 
cial and reputational defeat, not only because it 
had lost a market, but also because the Arbitral 
Tribunal dismissed Russia’s multi-billion-dollar 
claims concerning the quantities of gas that 
had not been bought by Ukraine as part of the 
‘take or pay’ clause included in the gas supply 
contract. Thus Gazprom’s defeats in its lawsuits 
against Naftohaz may encourage other import-
ers to assume a more assertive stance in their 
negotiations with Gazprom. 
Last but not least, Gazprom has failed to dis-
credit Ukraine as a transit country. Both dip-
lomatic and legal instruments have proved 
ineffective. Even though Moscow used the tri-
lateral Russia-Ukraine-EU talks initiated in May 
2014 to highlight the risk linked to gas transit 
via Ukraine, this in fact led to the development 
of solutions that which improved the security 
of supplies in the heating seasons 2014-15 and 
2015-16. Gazprom’s consistent narrative that 
it was necessary to fill Ukrainian gas storage 
facilities with Russian gas at a level of at least 
18-19 bcm to guarantee a secure transit was 
called into question (in fact, in 2014-2017 a lev-
el not exceeding 17 bcm of gas was sufficient to 
survive the heating seasons and to ensure un-
interrupted transit). In practice, the only source 
of doubts concerning the transit was Gazprom 
itself, which reduced the volume of supplies to 
European recipients between September 2014 
and March 2015 (deliveries of Russian gas were 
below the volumes nominated by some Europe-
an importers) and lowered the pressure in the 
transit gas pipelines running through Ukraine.
Both awards passed by the Arbitral Tribunal 
mean a financial and reputational defeat for 
Gazprom, and will undermine its position 
in negotiations with other contractors. 
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The new post-arbitration era – possible 
scenarios of relations between Gazprom 
and Naftohaz 
The victory for Naftohaz in its court dispute 
with Gazprom at the Arbitral Tribunal10 opens 
up a completely new chapter in co-operation 
between the two companies. It seems obvious 
that a return to ‘business as usual’, i.e. the mod-
el in which Ukraine is the supplicant and Russia 
unilaterally dictates the conditions, can be ruled 
out. We should expect this success to encour-
age Kyiv to maintain its assertive position in its 
dealings with Gazprom and to continue claim-
ing its rights in court, especially given the Rus-
sian company’s refusal to comply with the Arbi-
tral Tribunal awards. The Ukrainian government 
has capitalised politically on Gazprom’s defeat 
on the international arena, reasonably pointing 
out that it is the Russian company who is the 
unreliable partner in supplying gas to Europe 
and an entity which refuses to implement deci-
sions of the Arbitral Tribunal. This message is in-
tended at discrediting the Russian company and 
reducing the chance for the implementation of 
the Nord Stream 2 project. This gas pipeline is 
viewed in Ukraine as the greatest threat to the 
country’s energy security, and Ukraine’s victory 
in the legal dispute with Gazprom objectively 
strengthens its position, as both the EU’s part-
ner in Russian gas transit and in dealings with 
Gazprom ahead of the negotiations preceding 
the signing of a new transit contract.
All this suggests that Russia will not manage 
to become completely independent from the 
Ukrainian transit route by 2020, which was 
a strategic goal of Moscow’s energy policy. 
Turkish Stream is the only alternative to the 
Ukrainian transport route that is currently be-
ing built (as of 6 March 2018, 50% of the mari-
10 S. Kardaś, W. Konończuk, Naftohaz’s victory over Gaz-
prom: the Arbitral Tribunal’s award on the transit con-
tract, OSW Analyses, 7.03.2018, https://www.osw.waw.
pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2018-03-07/naftohazs-victo-
ry-over-gazprom-arbitral-tribunals-award-transit
time section of both branches of this gas pipe-
line have been completed). While it is basically 
certain that the first branch of this gas route 
will be launched (this branch will be used for 
supplying gas to the Turkish market; this will 
allow around 15 bcm of gas that is currently 
exported to Turkey via Ukraine to be redirected 
to the new pipeline), it is still unclear whether 
and when it will be possible to use the second 
branch of the gas pipeline which is being built 
in parallel to the first one. European countries 
are the expected recipients of the gas that will 
be transported via the parallel section of Turk-
ish Stream, but the agreements concerning 
their participation in the project are still prelim-
inary (its launch would enable the transport of 
15 bcm of gas annually). 
The future of the Nord Stream 2 project (a total 
capacity of 55 bcm of gas annually) is also un-
clear. The procedures for obtaining permits to 
build the maritime sections of the gas pipeline 
in Finland, Sweden and Denmark are underway, 
but it is unclear whether these will be complet-
ed by the end of 2018. Another problem is the 
gas pipeline’s legal status in the light of the 
regulations of European energy law (work on 
amending the gas directive intended at extend-
ing EU regulations to the project is underway; 
the issue of the mandate for launching Rus-
sia-EU negotiations on the special legal regime 
for Nord Stream 2 has been suspended). Thus 
the completion of the gas pipeline within the 
deadline declared by Gazprom – the end of 
2019 – at present seems unrealistic, although 
Gazprom does not seem to be withdrawing 
from its implementation.
Russia will not be able to become complete-
ly independent from the Ukrainian trans-
port route by 2020, which will strengthen 
the position of Naftohaz in negotiations on 
a new transit contract with Gazprom. 
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As a consequence, Gazprom will have to enter 
into a new transit contract with Ukraine, at least 
for the transit of Russian gas to European buy-
ers via Ukraine in 2020-21. In an extremely un-
favourable scenario, the Russian company will 
need the Ukrainian route to transport gas to 
Europe at a level of around 70-80 bcm of gas an-
nually (in case supplies via one branch of Turkish 
Stream are launched). It is only in the maximally 
favourable, albeit quite unrealistic, variant (the 
launch of supplies via both branches of Turkish 
Stream) that it might reduce transit dependence 
on Ukraine to the level of 53-64 bcm by the end 
of 2019. Since Gazprom will most likely be inter-
ested in a short-term contract, this is bound to 
become a serious subject of dispute in future ne-
gotiations with Naftohaz. Kyiv, in turn, will take 
a hard-line stance, being aware of the fact that 
Gazprom will be unable to withdraw from transit 
via Ukraine. Naftohaz’s goal will be to negoti-
ate as long a term of the contract as possible, 
with higher transit rates than before, and with 
the ‘ship or pay’ clause included in the agree-
ment. As an alternative, the Ukrainian compa-
ny will make efforts to convince EU contrac-
tors to shift the points of receiving Russian gas 
from the Ukrainian-EU border to the Ukrainian- 
-Russian border.
At the same time, Russia is likely to become in-
dependent from the Ukrainian gas transit in the 
medium term, although this will require a num-
ber of conditions to be fulfilled: firstly, building 
all the planned gas pipelines running to Europe; 
and secondly, consent from Western European 
partners, in particular recipients in Central and 
Southern Europe, to shift the contractual points 
of receiving Russian gas in connection with the 
launch of the new transport routes. 
